Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics | Zendy

Sandholm William H. | Zendy

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Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics

Author(s) -

Sandholm William H.

Publication year - 2010

Publication title -

theoretical economics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404

H-Index - 32

eISSN - 1555-7561

pISSN - 1933-6837

DOI - 10.3982/te505

Subject(s) - stability (learning theory) , mathematical economics , dynamics (music) , evolutionary dynamics , computer science , game theory , evolutionary game theory , economics , sociology , population , demography , machine learning , pedagogy

We prove that any regular evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of regular ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.

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