Open AccessLocal stability under evolutionary game dynamics
Author(s) -
Sandholm William H.
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te505
Subject(s) - stability (learning theory) , mathematical economics , dynamics (music) , evolutionary dynamics , computer science , game theory , evolutionary game theory , economics , sociology , population , demography , machine learning , pedagogy
We prove that any regular evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of regular ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.