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Uniform topologies on types
Author(s) -
Chen YiChun,
Di Tillio Alfredo,
Faingold Eduardo,
Xiong Siyang
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te462
Subject(s) - network topology , computer science , mathematics , topology (electrical circuits) , combinatorics , computer network
We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher‐order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform‐weak topology , under which two types are close if they have similar first‐order beliefs, attach similar probabilities to other players having similar first‐order beliefs, and so on, where the degree of similarity is uniform over the levels of the belief hierarchy. This topology generalizes the now classic notion of proximity to common knowledge based on common p‐beliefs (Monderer and Samet 1989). We show that convergence in the uniform‐weak topology implies convergence in the uniform‐strategic topology (Dekel et al. 2006). Moreover, when the limit is a finite type, uniform‐weak convergence is also a necessary condition for convergence in the strategic topology. Finally, we show that the set of finite types is nowhere dense under the uniform strategic topology. Thus, our results shed light on the connection between similarity of beliefs and similarity of behaviors in games.

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