z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
Family ties: School assignment with siblings
Author(s) -
Dur Umut,
Morrill Thayer,
Phan William
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te4086
Subject(s) - school choice , generalization , sibling , computer science , mathematics education , psychology , mathematics , political science , law , developmental psychology , mathematical analysis
We introduce a generalization of the school choice problem motivated by the following observations: students are assigned to grades within schools, many students have siblings who are applying as well, and school districts commonly guarantee that siblings will attend the same school. This last condition disqualifies the standard approach of considering grades independently as it may separate siblings. We argue that the central criterion in school choice—elimination of justified envy—is now inadequate as it does not consider siblings. We propose a new solution concept, suitability , that addresses this concern, and we introduce a new family of strategy‐proof mechanisms where each satisfies it. Using data from the Wake County magnet school assignment, we demonstrate the impact on families of our proposed mechanism versus the “naive” assignment where sibling constraints are not taken into account.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here