Open AccessCensorship as optimal persuasion
Author(s) -
Kolotilin Anton,
Mylovanov Timofiy,
Zapechelnyuk Andriy
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te4071
Subject(s) - communication source , persuasion , cutoff , marginal utility , mathematical economics , censorship , state (computer science) , expected utility hypothesis , computer science , microeconomics , economics , psychology , political science , physics , social psychology , telecommunications , law , algorithm , quantum mechanics
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's marginal utility is quasi‐concave. Moreover, we show that it is optimal to reveal less information if the sender becomes more risk averse or the sender's utility shifts to the left. Finally, we apply our results to the problem of media censorship by a government.