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Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
Author(s) -
Li Yunan
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te3907
Subject(s) - lottery , valuation (finance) , microeconomics , private information retrieval , principal (computer security) , cash , mechanism design , welfare , budget constraint , economics , business , finance , computer science , computer security , market economy
A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget‐constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare‐maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two‐stage scheme. First, agents report their budgets, receive cash transfers, and decide whether to enter a lottery over the good. Second, recipients of the good can sell it on a resale market but must pay a sales tax. Low‐budget agents receive a higher cash transfer, pay a lower price to enter the lottery, and face a higher sales tax. They are also randomly inspected.

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