Open AccessInformation aggregation in Poisson elections
Author(s) -
Ekmekci Mehmet,
Lauermann Stephan
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te3849
Subject(s) - condorcet method , mathematical economics , information aggregation , population , jury , aggregate (composite) , state (computer science) , economics , microeconomics , voting , mathematics , computer science , political science , law , sociology , materials science , demography , algorithm , politics , composite material , data mining
The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern Condorcet jury theorem holds if and only if the expected number of voters is independent of the state. If the expected number of voters depends on the state, then additional equilibria exist in which information is not aggregated. The main driving force is that, everything else equal, voters are more likely to be pivotal if the population is small.