Open AccessCommon learning and cooperation in repeated games
Author(s) -
Sugaya Takuo,
Yamamoto Yuichi
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te3820
Subject(s) - repeated game , sequence (biology) , folk theorem , mathematical economics , state (computer science) , computer science , common knowledge (logic) , artificial intelligence , game theory , mathematics , equilibrium selection , algorithm , epistemic modal logic , genetics , multimodal logic , description logic , biology
We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the state becomes asymptotic common knowledge.