Open AccessRepeated Nash implementation
Author(s) -
Mezzetti Claudio,
Renou Ludovic
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te1988
Subject(s) - extension (predicate logic) , monotonic function , mathematical economics , discounting , nash equilibrium , social choice theory , repeated game , computer science , horizon , mathematics , mathematical optimization , game theory , economics , mathematical analysis , finance , programming language , geometry
We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity , a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount factor is “large” or “small.”