Open AccessComparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
Author(s) -
Arribillaga R. Pablo,
Massó Jordi
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te1910
Subject(s) - comparability , mathematics , monotonic function , simple (philosophy) , outcome (game theory) , mathematical economics , statistics , computer science , combinatorics , mathematical analysis , philosophy , epistemology
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes: the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.