Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability | Zendy

Arribillaga R. Pablo | Zendy; Massó Jordi | Zendy

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Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability

Author(s) -

Arribillaga R. Pablo,

Massó Jordi

Publication year - 2016

Publication title -

theoretical economics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404

H-Index - 32

eISSN - 1555-7561

pISSN - 1933-6837

DOI - 10.3982/te1910

Subject(s) - comparability , mathematics , monotonic function , simple (philosophy) , mathematical economics , statistics , econometrics , combinatorics , mathematical analysis , philosophy , epistemology

We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes: the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.

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