Open AccessReputation without commitment in finitely repeated games
Author(s) -
Weinstein Jonathan,
Yildiz Muhamet
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te1893
Subject(s) - complete information , reputation , repeated game , mathematical economics , microeconomics , game theory , mathematics , economics , computer science , social science , sociology
In the reputation literature, players have commitment types , which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs, but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage payoffs. In particular, any finitely repeated game with commitment types is strategically equivalent to a standard finitely repeated game with incomplete information about the stage payoffs. Then classic reputation results can be achieved with uncertainty concerning only the stage payoffs.