Open AccessThe folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time
Author(s) -
Bernard Benjamin,
Frei Christoph
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te1687
Subject(s) - folk theorem , imperfect , mathematical economics , computer science , noise (video) , foundation (evidence) , mathematics , repeated game , game theory , equilibrium selection , artificial intelligence , law , political science , philosophy , linguistics , image (mathematics)
We prove a folk theorem for multiplayer games in continuous time when players observe a public signal distorted by Brownian noise. The proof is based on a rigorous foundation for such continuous‐time multiplayer games. We study in detail the relation between behavior and mixed strategies, and the role of public randomization to move continuously across games within the same model.