Open AccessMajority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
Author(s) -
Bouton Laurent,
Gratton Gabriele
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te1642
Subject(s) - condorcet method , voting , approval voting , mathematical economics , democratic legitimacy , microeconomics , instant runoff voting , economics , legitimacy , cardinal voting systems , preference , bullet voting , political science , disapproval voting , law , politics
The majority runoff system is widely used around the world, yet our understanding of its properties and of voters' behavior is limited. In this paper, we fully characterize the set of strictly perfect voting equilibria in large three‐candidate majority runoff elections. Considering all possible distributions of preference orderings and intensities, we prove that only two types of equilibria can exist. First, there are always equilibria in which only two candidates receive votes. Second, there may exist an equilibrium in which three candidates receive votes. Its characteristics challenge common beliefs: (i) neither sincere voting by all voters nor pushover tactics (i.e., supporters of the front‐runner voting for a less preferred candidate so as to influence who will face the front‐runner in the second round) are supported in equilibrium, and (ii) the winner does not necessarily have democratic legitimacy since the Condorcet winner may not even participate in the second round.