Open AccessCharacterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
Author(s) -
Sugaya Takuo
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te1425
Subject(s) - discounting , limit (mathematics) , mathematical economics , set (abstract data type) , economics , microeconomics , mathematics , econometrics , computer science , finance , mathematical analysis , programming language
We study repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and unequal discounting. We characterize the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players fixed. We show that the pairwise and individual full rank conditions are sufficient for the folk theorem.