Open AccessRationalizable partition‐confirmed equilibrium
Author(s) -
Fudenberg Drew,
Kamada Yuichiro
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te1362
Subject(s) - partition (number theory) , rationality , mathematical economics , rationalizability , computer science , mathematics , nash equilibrium , combinatorics , epistemology , philosophy
Rationalizable partition‐confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady‐state outcomes of rational learning in extensive‐form games when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.