Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games | Zendy

CarbonellNicolau Oriol | Zendy; McLean Richard P. | Zendy

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Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

Author(s) -

CarbonellNicolau Oriol,

McLean Richard P.

Publication year - 2014

Publication title -

theoretical economics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404

H-Index - 32

eISSN - 1555-7561

pISSN - 1933-6837

DOI - 10.3982/te1178

Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , mathematical economics , epsilon equilibrium , set (abstract data type) , trembling hand perfect equilibrium , best response , equilibrium selection , correlated equilibrium , mathematics , computer science , game theory , repeated game , programming language

We prove the existence of a pure‐strategy trembling‐hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure‐strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure‐strategy Nash equilibria.

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