Open AccessRefinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games
Author(s) -
CarbonellNicolau Oriol,
McLean Richard P.
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te1178
Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , mathematical economics , epsilon equilibrium , set (abstract data type) , trembling hand perfect equilibrium , best response , equilibrium selection , correlated equilibrium , mathematics , computer science , game theory , repeated game , programming language
We prove the existence of a pure‐strategy trembling‐hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure‐strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure‐strategy Nash equilibria.