Open AccessCollege choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: A structural empirical analysis
Author(s) -
Carvalho José Raimundo,
Magnac Thierry,
Xiong Qizhou
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
quantitative economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.062
H-Index - 27
eISSN - 1759-7331
pISSN - 1759-7323
DOI - 10.3982/qe951
Subject(s) - counterfactual thinking , counterfactual conditional , redistribution (election) , selection (genetic algorithm) , welfare , school choice , set (abstract data type) , quality (philosophy) , choice set , discrete choice , mechanism (biology) , economics , microeconomics , computer science , psychology , econometrics , social psychology , political science , philosophy , epistemology , artificial intelligence , politics , law , market economy , programming language
We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities and student preferences are shown to be identified from data on their choices and their exam grades under exclusion restrictions and support conditions. The counterfactuals we consider balance the severity of congestion and the quality of the match between schools and students. Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of choices and exams are shown to increase welfare. Redistribution among students and among schools is also sizeable in all counterfactual experiments.