Open AccessClearinghouses for two‐sided matching: An experimental study
Author(s) -
Echenique Federico,
Wilson Alistair J.,
Yariv Leeat
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
quantitative economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.062
H-Index - 27
eISSN - 1759-7331
pISSN - 1759-7323
DOI - 10.3982/qe496
Subject(s) - stylized fact , matching (statistics) , set (abstract data type) , core (optical fiber) , outcome (game theory) , preference , order (exchange) , economics , computer science , econometrics , microeconomics , psychology , statistics , mathematics , telecommunications , finance , macroeconomics , programming language
We experimentally study the Gale and Shapley, 1962 mechanism, which is utilized in a wide set of applications, most prominently the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Several insights come out of our analysis. First, only 48% of our observed outcomes are stable, and among those a large majority culminate at the receiver‐optimal stable matching. Second, receivers rarely truncate their true preferences: it is the proposers who do not make offers in order of their preference, frequently skipping potential partners. Third, market characteristics affect behavior: both the cardinal representation and core size influence whether laboratory outcomes are stable. We conclude by using our controlled results and a behavioral model to shed light on a number of stylized facts we derive from new NRMP survey and outcome data, and to explain the small cores previously documented for the NRMP.