Open AccessA note on identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games
Author(s) -
Fox Jeremy T.,
Lazzati Natalia
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
quantitative economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.062
H-Index - 27
eISSN - 1759-7331
pISSN - 1759-7323
DOI - 10.3982/qe489
Subject(s) - identification (biology) , binary number , bundle , nonparametric statistics , selection (genetic algorithm) , mathematical economics , class (philosophy) , discrete choice , process (computing) , computer science , equilibrium selection , mathematics , mathematical optimization , econometrics , game theory , repeated game , machine learning , artificial intelligence , botany , materials science , arithmetic , composite material , biology , operating system
We study nonparametric identification of single‐agent discrete choice models for bundles (without requiring bundle‐specific prices) and of binary games of complete information. We show that these two models are quite similar from an identification standpoint. Moreover, they are mathematically equivalent when we restrict attention to the class of potential games and impose a specific equilibrium selection mechanism in the data generating process. We provide new identification results for the two related models.