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Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues
Author(s) -
Godefroy Raphael,
PerezRichet Eduardo
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.3982/ecta9709
Subject(s) - voting , interim , setter , selection (genetic algorithm) , social choice theory , social planner , planner , majority rule , political science , economics , operations research , microeconomics , computer science , law , engineering , artificial intelligence , politics , archaeology , history
We study selection rules: voting procedures used by committees to choose whether to place an issue on their agenda. At the selection stage of the model, committee members are uncertain about their final preferences. They only have some private information about these preferences. We show that voters become more conservative when the selection rule itself becomes more conservative. The decision rule has the opposite effect. We compare these voting procedures to the designation of an agenda setter among the committee and to a utilitarian social planner with all the ex interim private information.