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A Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilities
Author(s) -
Karni Edi
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.3982/ecta7833
Subject(s) - mechanism (biology) , economics , econometrics , mathematical economics , computer science , philosophy , epistemology
This paper describes a direct revelation mechanism for eliciting agents' subjective probabilities. The game induced by the mechanism has a dominant strategy equilibrium in which the players reveal their subjective probabilities.
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