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Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents
Author(s) -
Yamashita Takuro
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.3982/ecta7005
Subject(s) - mathematical economics , sort , class (philosophy) , mechanism (biology) , principal (computer security) , value (mathematics) , incentive compatibility , incentive , mechanism design , economics , strategic dominance , game theory , microeconomics , mathematics , computer science , arithmetic , statistics , artificial intelligence , philosophy , epistemology , operating system
We consider a class of mechanism games in which there are multiple principals and three or more agents. For a mechanism game in this class, a sort of folk theorem holds: there is a threshold value for each of the principals such that an allocation is achieved at a pure‐strategy sequential equilibrium of the game if and only if (i) it is incentive compatible and (ii) it attains an expected utility for each principal that is greater than or equal to the threshold value for the principal.