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The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
Author(s) -
Sannikov Yuliy,
Skrzypacz Andrzej
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.3982/ecta6420
Subject(s) - mathematical economics , economics , repeated game , psychology , computer science , game theory
We show that in repeated interactions the avenues for effective provision of incentives depend crucially on the type of information players observe. We establish this conclusion for general repeated two‐player games in which information arrives via a continuous‐time stationary process that has a continuous multidimensional Brownian component and a Poisson component, and in which the players act frequently. The Poisson jumps can be used to effectively provide incentives both with transfers and value burning, while continuous Brownian information can be used to provide incentives only with transfers.

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