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A Model of Scientific Communication
Author(s) -
Andrews Isaiah,
Shapiro Jesse M.
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.3982/ecta18155
Subject(s) - contrast (vision) , stochastic game , computer science , econometrics , scientific modelling , mathematical economics , psychology , artificial intelligence , economics , epistemology , philosophy
We propose a positive model of empirical science in which an analyst makes a report to an audience after observing some data. Agents in the audience may differ in their beliefs or objectives, and may therefore update or act differently following a given report. We contrast the proposed model with a classical model of statistics in which the report directly determines the payoff. We identify settings in which the predictions of the proposed model differ from those of the classical model, and seem to better match practice.