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The “New” Economics of Trade Agreements: From Trade Liberalization to Regulatory Convergence?
Author(s) -
Grossman Gene M.,
McCalman Phillip,
Staiger Robert W.
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.3982/ecta17536
Subject(s) - protectionism , externality , incentive , economics , commercial policy , trade barrier , international economics , product (mathematics) , consumption (sociology) , international trade , negotiation , free trade , gains from trade , microeconomics , industrial organization , comparative advantage , business , social science , geometry , mathematics , sociology , political science , law
What incentives do governments have to negotiate trade agreements that constrain their domestic regulatory policies? We study a model in which firms design products to appeal to local consumer tastes, but their fixed costs increase with the difference between versions of their product destined for different markets. In this setting, firms' profit‐maximizing choices of product attributes are globally optimal in the absence of consumption externalities, but national governments have unilateral incentives to invoke regulatory protectionism to induce firm delocation. An efficient trade agreement requires commitments not to engage in such opportunistic behavior. A rule requiring mutual recognition of standards can be used to achieve efficiency, but one that requires only national treatment falls short. When product attributes confer local consumption externalities, an efficient trade agreement must coordinate the fine details of countries' regulatory policies.