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The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching
Author(s) -
Deb Joyee,
Sugaya Takuo,
Wolitzky Alexander
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.3982/ecta16680
Subject(s) - folk theorem , matching (statistics) , repeated game , curse of dimensionality , mathematical economics , mathematics , discrete mathematics , game theory , computer science , combinatorics , statistics , equilibrium selection
We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games with anonymous random matching. We allow non‐uniform matching, include asymmetric payoffs, and place no restrictions on the stage game other than full dimensionality. No record‐keeping or communication devices—including cheap talk communication and public randomization—are necessary.