Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver | Zendy

Kolotilin Anton | Zendy; Mylovanov Tymofiy | Zendy; Zapechelnyuk Andriy | Zendy; Li Ming | Zendy

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Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver

Author(s) -

Kolotilin Anton,

Mylovanov Tymofiy,

Zapechelnyuk Andriy,

Li Ming

Publication year - 2017

Publication title -

econometrica

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7

H-Index - 199

eISSN - 1468-0262

pISSN - 0012-9682

DOI - 10.3982/ecta13251

Subject(s) - persuasion , research council , social research , public relations , political science , business , economics , psychology , sociology , social psychology , government (linguistics) , social science , linguistics , philosophy

We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff‐relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.

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