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Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
Author(s) -
Kolotilin Anton,
Mylovanov Tymofiy,
Zapechelnyuk Andriy,
Li Ming
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.3982/ecta13251
Subject(s) - persuasion , advertising , psychology , social psychology , computer science , economics , law and economics , business
We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff‐relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.