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Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism
Author(s) -
Chiesa Alessandro,
Micali Silvio,
Zhu Zeyuan Allen
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.3982/ecta12131
Subject(s) - knightian uncertainty , mechanism (biology) , mathematical economics , economics , computer science , physics , programming language , ambiguity , quantum mechanics
We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences. In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant‐strategy, and we prove that all dominant‐strategy mechanisms are inadequate. However, we also prove that, in undominated strategies, the social welfare produced by the Vickrey mechanism in the worst case is not only very good, but also essentially optimal.

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