Stable Matching With Incomplete Information | Zendy

Liu Qingmin | Zendy; Mailath George J. | Zendy; Postlewaite Andrew | Zendy; Samuelson Larry | Zendy

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Stable Matching With Incomplete Information

Author(s) -

Liu Qingmin,

Mailath George J.,

Postlewaite Andrew,

Samuelson Larry

Publication year - 2014

Publication title -

econometrica

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7

H-Index - 199

eISSN - 1468-0262

pISSN - 0012-9682

DOI - 10.3982/ecta11183

Subject(s) - matching (statistics) , complete information , computer science , economics , econometrics , mathematical economics , mathematics , statistics

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one‐sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make. We show that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty in incomplete‐information environments, and is a superset of the set of complete‐information stable outcomes. We then provide sufficient conditions for incomplete‐information stable matchings to be efficient. Lastly, we define a notion of price‐sustainable allocations and show that the set of incomplete‐information stable matchings is a subset of the set of such allocations.

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