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Alliance strategy of construction and demolition waste recycling based on the modified shapley value under government regulation
Author(s) -
Jun Huang,
Ying Peng,
Ruwen Tan,
Chunxiang Guo
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
journal of industrial and management optimization
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.325
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1553-166X
pISSN - 1547-5816
DOI - 10.3934/jimo.2020113
Subject(s) - alliance , subsidy , stackelberg competition , shapley value , business , profit (economics) , government (linguistics) , industrial organization , value (mathematics) , imperfect , environmental economics , microeconomics , game theory , economics , computer science , market economy , linguistics , philosophy , machine learning , political science , law
Construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling enterprises have an imperfect operation system, which leads to low recovery rate and low production profits. A feasible method to improve this situation involves seeking a high-efficiency enterprise alliance strategy in the CDW recycling system composed of manufacturers, retailers and recyclers and designing a reasonable and effective coordination mechanism to enhance their enthusiasm for participa-tion. First, we constructed a Stackelberg game model of CDW recycling under government regulation and analyzed the optimal alliance strategy of CDW recycling enterprises under punishment or subsidy by the government as a game leader. In order to ensure the stable cooperation of the alliance, we used the Shapley value method to coordinate the distribution of the optimal alliance profit and improved the fairness and effectiveness of the coordination mechanism through modification of the unequal rights factor. Finally, based on the survey data of Chongqing, we further verified the conclusion through numerical simulation and an-alyzed changes in various parameters at different product costs. The results show that the alliance strategy and coordination mechanism can improve the CDW recovery rate, improve the recycling market status, and increase the production profits of enterprises.

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