Open AccessDelegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium
Author(s) -
Yu Chen
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
journal of dynamics and games
Language(s) - Uncategorized
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2164-6074
pISSN - 2164-6066
DOI - 10.3934/jdg.2018019
Subject(s) - delegation , mechanism design , ex ante , strategic dominance , participation constraint , principal (computer security) , externality , mathematical economics , mechanism (biology) , microeconomics , computer science , constraint (computer aided design) , principal–agent problem , agency (philosophy) , rationality , game theory , product (mathematics) , information asymmetry , economics , mathematics , computer security , incentive , law , political science , corporate governance , philosophy , geometry , management , epistemology , macroeconomics , finance
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