Open AccessWhy do stable clearinghouses work so well? - Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
Author(s) -
Alvin E. Roth
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
journal of dynamics and games
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2164-6074
pISSN - 2164-6066
DOI - 10.3934/jdg.2015009
Subject(s) - preference , matching (statistics) , set (abstract data type) , computer science , stability (learning theory) , profit (economics) , mathematical economics , work (physics) , stability theorem , mathematics , microeconomics , economics , mathematical analysis , mechanical engineering , statistics , machine learning , engineering , programming language , cauchy distribution
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