Open AccessFirms, technology, training and government fiscal policies: An evolutionary approach
Author(s) -
Elvio Accinelli,
Filipe Martins,
Humberto García Muñiz,
Bruno Oliveira,
Alberto A. Pinto
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
discrete and continuous dynamical systems. series b
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.864
H-Index - 53
eISSN - 1553-524X
pISSN - 1531-3492
DOI - 10.3934/dcdsb.2021180
Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , poverty trap , novelty , economics , poverty , government (linguistics) , trap (plumbing) , microeconomics , mathematical economics , economic growth , physics , psychology , linguistics , philosophy , meteorology , social psychology
In this paper we propose and analyze a game theoretical model regarding the dynamical interaction between government fiscal policy choices toward innovation and training (I&T), firm's innovation, and worker's levels of training and education. We discuss four economic scenarios corresponding to strict pure Nash equilibria: the government and I&T poverty trap, the I&T poverty trap, the I&T high premium niche, and the I&T ideal growth. The main novelty of this model is to consider the government as one of the three interacting players in the game that also allow us to analyse the I&T mixed economic scenarios with a unique strictly mixed Nash equilibrium and with I&T evolutionary dynamical cycles.