Open AccessSTRATEGIES FOR AVOIDING ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Author(s) -
Martin Schieg
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
journal of business economics and management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.485
H-Index - 37
eISSN - 1611-1699
pISSN - 2029-4433
DOI - 10.3846/1611-1699.2008.9.47-51
Subject(s) - information asymmetry , multitude , closing (real estate) , principal (computer security) , project management , business , risk analysis (engineering) , principal–agent problem , computer science , process management , operations management , economics , microeconomics , finance , management , political science , computer security , corporate governance , law
A construction project is characterized by a high number of project participants and a multitude of contract relations. The Principal Agent Theory deals with the design of contracts, especially with respect to asymmetric information. Asymmetric distribution of information in co‐operations can have effects before as well as after closing a contract. In construction project management therefore attention has to be paid to where information imbalances occur. Several methods are known with which one can cope with the resulting problems but which in turn cause costs.