Open AccessBEHAVIORAL ASPECTS OF REGULATOR DECISIONS
Author(s) -
Natalia Pavlova
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
naučnye issledovaniâ èkonomičeskogo fakulʹteta
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2078-3809
DOI - 10.38050/2078-3809-2017-9-1-7-18
Subject(s) - rationality , regulator , management science , computer science , risk analysis (engineering) , economics , operations research , microeconomics , business , engineering , political science , law , biochemistry , chemistry , gene
The findings of many behavioral economics studies have led many experts to share the view that the effects of limited rationality can be solved through the proper development of the menu options available to the consumer. The devising of such a menu rests on the shoulders of regulators. However, the question arises as to how regulators themselves, in turn, are limitedly rational, and how much they are motivated to provide an optimal menu of contracts that ensures maximum social welfare, given that designing such a menu is costly. This paper systematizes the main manifestations of limited rationality which can influence decision-making by regulators. An attempt is made to answer two questions: is there a need and possibility to take into account the limited rationality of civil servants in modeling the actions of the regulator and are special practical measures required to correct for the identified effects.