z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
The problem of counterfactual de re attitudes
Author(s) -
Igor Yanovich
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
proceedings from semantics and linguistic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2163-5951
pISSN - 2163-5943
DOI - 10.3765/salt.v0i0.2620
Subject(s) - counterfactual thinking , doxastic logic , phenomenon , counterfactual conditional , econometrics , mathematical economics , psychology , social psychology , mathematics , epistemology , philosophy
The problem of counterfactual attitudes de re was identified by Ninan (2008) as a challenge for standard theories of de re. I show that once counterfactual non-de re attitudes are properly analyzed, trivial composition of such an analysis for them with the analysis of doxastic de re provides the solution to the problem. Thus there is no independent phenomenon of counterfactual attitudes de re, and therefore no problem as such.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here