Open AccessExploring Options for Missile Verification
Author(s) -
Павел Подвиг,
Markus Schiller,
Amy F. Woolf,
Christine Parthemore,
Almudena Azcárate Ortega,
Dmitry Stefanovich,
Decker Eveleth
Publication year - 2022
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Reports
DOI - 10.37559/wmd/22/misver/01
Subject(s) - missile , transparency (behavior) , disarmament , variety (cybernetics) , arms control , computer security , missile defense , computer science , arms race , systems engineering , control (management) , risk analysis (engineering) , engineering , political science , business , law , aerospace engineering , artificial intelligence , history , economic history
Missiles are becoming an increasingly prominent element of military arsenals, but the system of arms control that helped provide a check on the missile arms race is under considerable stress. Addressing this challenge will require developing new approaches to missile verification. This report covers various aspects of verification arrangements that could be applied to missiles. The authors look at the experience of past arms control and disarmament efforts, provide an overview of existing verification tools, and initiate a discussion of potential arrangements that could make future arms control agreements possible. The general conclusion of the report is that there is a variety of options to consider. Most verification arrangements would require a fairly high level of transparency, but that is what makes them stronger and more reliable. The path to building an effective verification arrangement is to design it in a way that facilitates cooperation and transparency.