Open AccessThe Problem of Natural Law in the Works of Ivan Ilyin and Leo Strauss
Author(s) -
Ilya V. Demin,
AUTHOR_ID
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
vestnik severnogo (arktičeskogo) federalʹnogo universiteta. seriâ «gumanitarnye i socialʹnye nauki»/vestnik severnogo (arktičeskogo) federalʹnogo universiteta. seriâ: "gumanitarnye i socialʹnye nauki"
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2687-1505
pISSN - 2227-6564
DOI - 10.37482/2687-1505-v147
Subject(s) - epistemology , natural law , historicism , philosophy , natural (archaeology) , interpretation (philosophy) , philosophy of law , relativism , law , comparative law , political science , history , linguistics , archaeology
This article provides a comparative analysis of two interpretations and methodological strategies of substantiating the idea of natural law, which belong to Ivan Ilyin and Leo Strauss. The comparative method was used in the research process, while the problem-topic method was applied to the analysis and presentation of the material. The two interpretations of natural law were compared on the basis of the following criteria: 1) interpretation of the principle of historicism and assessment of its prospects for substantiating natural legal thinking; 2) correlation between natural and positive law; 3) interpretation of the essence of philosophy, relationship between the general understanding of the nature of philosophical knowledge and the principles of natural legal thinking; 4) correlation between law and religion. Both Ilyin and Strauss saw in natural law an invariant basis of positive law. Criticism of the principle of historicism (understood as relativism) is a conceptual prerequisite for the reactualization of the idea of natural law in the works of both philosophers. However, Ilyin sees in historicism an annoying prejudice and a product of a “sick” legal consciousness, while Strauss views historicism as the main challenge facing the classical philosophical tradition. The differences in the substantiation of natural law by the two philosophers stem from the differences in their understanding of the nature of philosophical knowledge. For Ilyin, philosophy begins with studying the meaning of axioms, while for Strauss, philosophy as “knowledge of ignorance” begins with a critical formulation and comprehension of fundamental questions. The most significant differences in the philosophical and legal concepts of Ilyin and Strauss are associated with the problem of the relationship between law and religion. According to Strauss, the universal rationaltheoretical substantiation of the idea of natural law cannot refer to religious experience and be based on revelation. According to Ilyin, the reference of the philosophy of law to religious experience is necessary, because normal legal consciousness has an essentially religious nature.