Open AccessRationalizing Mechanism Preference in Independent Private Value Auctions
Author(s) -
Philipp Limberg
Publication year - 2020
Language(s) - Uncategorized
Resource type - Dissertations/theses
DOI - 10.36837/chapman.000142
Subject(s) - common value auction , stylized fact , preference , microeconomics , economics , value (mathematics) , reservation price , english auction , auction theory , revealed preference , vickrey auction , private information retrieval , forward auction , institution , dutch auction , set (abstract data type) , reverse auction , revenue equivalence , computer science , programming language , computer security , machine learning , political science , law , macroeconomics
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