Open AccessWhy a Logic is not only its Set of Valid Inferences
Author(s) -
Eduardo Alejandro Barrio,
Federico Pailos
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
análisis filosófico
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.111
H-Index - 1
eISSN - 1851-9636
pISSN - 0326-1301
DOI - 10.36446/af.2021.461
Subject(s) - set (abstract data type) , computer science , logical consequence , non classical logic , epistemology , artificial intelligence , cognitive science , psychology , programming language , philosophy
The main idea that we want to defend in this paper is that the question of what a logic is should be addressed differently when structural properties enter the game. In particular, we want to support the idea according to which it is not enough to identify the set of valid inferences to characterize a logic. In other words, we will argue that two logical theories could identify the same set of validities (e.g. its logical truths and valid inferences), but not be the same logic.