Open AccessMoral Hazard on Public Health Insurance: Evidence from BPJS in Indonesia
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
international journal of innovative technology and exploring engineering
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2278-3075
DOI - 10.35940/ijitee.i1028.0789s219
Subject(s) - indonesian , moral hazard , indonesian government , actuarial science , government (linguistics) , health insurance , state (computer science) , business , test (biology) , law , political science , health care , economics , computer science , incentive , philosophy , linguistics , algorithm , microeconomics , paleontology , biology
In early 2014 State Health Insurance program was launched by Indonesian Government. The program is called Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (BPJS). The mission of the BPJS is that in the end of 2019 all Indonesian People are already covered by the State Health Insurance. This research is aimed to investigate that moral hazard is inevitable from the public health insurance. Using convenience method, 1011 data were collected. There are 893 member of BPJS, and there are 117 were not member of BPJS yet. One is datum missing. Cross-Tabulation and Chi-Square are employed to test the availability of moral hazard. It is found out that moral hazard is inevitable in the health insurance of BPJS. They are who are already member of BPJS tend to visit doctor frequently than that they are who are not member yet. They are whose premium are paid out of pocket tend to visit doctor more frequently than that they are whose premium is partly or totally paid by other parties