Open AccessTransition of Presidential Power: Institutions and Control
Author(s) -
Oleg Zaznaev,
В. В. Сидоров
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
international journal of engineering and advanced technology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2249-8958
DOI - 10.35940/ijeat.a3121.109119
Subject(s) - presidential system , presidency , elite , democracy , politics , political science , competition (biology) , power (physics) , position (finance) , corporate governance , political economy , state (computer science) , public administration , economics , law , management , computer science , ecology , physics , finance , algorithm , quantum mechanics , biology
The transfer of presidential power in a democratic regime is carried out through the institutional mechanism of public competition in elections. In this case, the phenomenon of “democratic uncertainty” arises, since it is not known who will become the winner and take the presidency. Under a democratic deficit regime, the political leader and the ruling elite seek to ensure a controlled transfer of presidential power to maintain their dominant position in politics and economics. The paper considers the models and institutional mechanisms that ensure a controlled transfer of presidential power: the constitutional change of a "second person" in the state; reduction of age or the abolition of the lower age “threshold” for a presidential candidate; creation of new posts; Mexican practice “Dedaso”; change in form of governance; institutional guarantees to the outgoing president.