Open AccessDivine Command Theory in the Passage of History
Author(s) -
Simin Rahimi
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
forum philosophicum
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2353-7043
pISSN - 1426-1898
DOI - 10.35765/forphil.2009.1402.23
Subject(s) - virtue , morality , philosophy , theism , argument (complex analysis) , action (physics) , epistemology , conformity , set (abstract data type) , law , computer science , political science , chemistry , biochemistry , physics , quantum mechanics , programming language
Are actions that are morally good, morally goosd because God makes them so (e.g., by commanding them)? Or does God urge humans to do them because they are morally good anyway? What is, in general, the relationship between divine commands and ethical duties? It is not an uncommon belief among theists that morality depends entirely on the will or commands of God: all moral facts consist exclusively in facts about his will or commands. Thus, not only is an action right because it is commanded by God, but its conformity to his commands is what alone makes it right. An action is right (wrong) solely because he commands (forbids) it, and solely in virtue of his doing so. This view has come to be known as the „divine command theory of morality". This paper is devoted to a brief reconstruction of claims and controversies surrounding the theory, beginning with Plato's Euthyphro, which is the historical initiator of the debate and to a reconstruction of the various lines of argument that have been set forth to defend the theory.