Open AccessSwinburne on the Euthyphro Dilemma. Can Supervenience Save Him?
Author(s) -
Simin Rahimi
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
forum philosophicum
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2353-7043
pISSN - 1426-1898
DOI - 10.35765/forphil.2008.1301.02
Subject(s) - philosophy , metaphysics , supervenience , epistemology , argument (complex analysis) , dilemma , philosophy of religion , moral dilemma , psychology , social psychology , chemistry , biochemistry
Modern philosophers normally either reject the „divine command theory” of ethics and argue that moral duties are independent of any commands, or make it dependent on God's commands but like Robert Adams modify their theory and identify moral duties in terms of the commands of a loving God. Adams regards this theory as metaphysically necessary. That is, if it is true, it is true in all possible worlds. But Swinburne's (1981) position is unprecedented insofar as he regards moral truths as analytically necessary. In this paper Swinburne's argument will be discussed and I will reveal some of the difficulties involved in categorising general moral principles (if there are such principles) as logical (analytical/necessary) truths.