Open AccessNormative Disagreements and Choice of Legal Concepts .
Author(s) -
MAXIM A. BELYAEV
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
trudy instituta gosudarstva i prava rossijskoj akademii nauk
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2073-4522
DOI - 10.35427/2073-4522-2020-15-3-belyaev
Subject(s) - normative , epistemology , realism , normative social influence , psychology , sociology , law , social psychology , political science , philosophy
The paper provides a commentary on the theses of the German juristLorenz Kähler on the formation of legal concepts. The author eliminates truth-characterization of normative judgments because there are no justification for these judgments. However, if we consider normative judgments as one of the factors in thechoice of legal concepts in the formation of a legal text, then the subjects who findthemselves in a situation of disagreement on any of the concepts should refer to thenormative facts (values, reasons, and obligations). Therefore, by allowing this type ofdisagreement, we implicitly accept normative realism as true. The author did not indicate what a normative anti-realist should refer to in controversial situations. SinceLorenz Kähler himself is anti-realistic about normative facts, his position is either contradictory or not good elaborated for understanding.