The introduction of the moral psychology in the ergon argument

In this paper, I discuss in detail one of the first conclusions drawn by Aristotle in the ergon argument. The paper provides an in-depth approach to Nicomachean Ethics’ lines 1098a3-4, where one reads: “λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος”. I divide the discussion into two parts. In the first part, I put under scrutiny how one should take the word “πρακτική” and argue that one should avoid taking this word as meaning “practical” in the passage. I will argue in favor of taking it as meaning “active”. The exegetical inconvenience of taking “πρακτική” as meaning “practical” is the fact that it restricts the results achieved in the ergon argument by excluding the possibility of contemplation being considered a eudaimon life. In the second part, I discuss the expression “λόγον ἔχον” and provide some arguments to take it as preliminarily introducing the criterion of division of the virtues that will be spelled out in EN I.13 so that the λόγον-ἔχον part of the soul here also makes reference to the virtue of the non-rational part, i.e., virtue of character. I offer a deflationary view by showing that the moral psychology is developed in EN I.7 within the limits imposed by the ergon argument.