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Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
Author(s) -
Kenneth Hendricks,
Joris Pinkse,
Robert H. Porter
Publication year - 2001
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Reports
DOI - 10.3386/w8294
Subject(s) - common value auction , bidding , economics , mathematical economics , value (mathematics) , microeconomics , symmetric equilibrium , econometrics , mathematics , game theory , statistics , equilibrium selection , repeated game

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