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Biased Monitors: Corporate Governance When Managerial Ability is Mis-assessed
Author(s) -
Benjamin E. Hermalin
Publication year - 2017
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Reports
DOI - 10.3386/w23776
Subject(s) - corporate governance , shareholder , fallacy , base (topology) , stakeholder , prospect theory , overconfidence effect , bayes' theorem , economics , business , computer science , actuarial science , microeconomics , psychology , social psychology , artificial intelligence , mathematics , management , bayesian probability , mathematical analysis , philosophy , epistemology

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