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Auction Design and Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum Auctions
Author(s) -
Patrick Bajari,
Jungwon Yeo
Publication year - 2008
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Reports
DOI - 10.3386/w14441
Subject(s) - tacit collusion , common value auction , collusion , business , spectrum auction , spectrum (functional analysis) , tacit knowledge , industrial organization , microeconomics , economics , auction theory , computer science , revenue equivalence , knowledge management , physics , quantum mechanics

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