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Independence of the central bank as a monetary policy authority
Author(s) -
Oleksandr LYUBICH,
Gennadiy BORTNIKOV,
Natalia Shulga
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
fìnansi ukraïni
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2522-4662
pISSN - 2305-7645
DOI - 10.33763/finukr2020.11.035
Subject(s) - independence (probability theory) , monetary policy , central bank , forward guidance , financial system , business , monetary economics , economics , inflation targeting , credit channel , statistics , mathematics

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