
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS IN FAMILY CONTROLLED FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM MALAYSIA
Author(s) -
Ei Yet Chu,
Tian So Lai,
Saw Imm Song
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
international journal of business and society
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.236
H-Index - 15
ISSN - 1511-6670
DOI - 10.33736/ijbs.534.2016
Subject(s) - corporate governance , finance , business , shareholder , equity (law) , cash flow , debt , investment (military) , financial system , economics , accounting , politics , law , political science
The hypothesis of financial constraints suggests that firms will be denied profitable investment dueto inaccessible to external capital markets as debt and equity financing are no longer perfectsubstitutions after firms utilize internal capital. In view of reduced investments during globalfinancial crisis in 2008-2009, the study investigates 157 firms, whether they face the issues offinancial constraints in Malaysia. In general, non-family firms rely heavily on the external debtmarket while family controlled firms utilizing internal cash and reducing their dependence on debtmarket for their investments, confirming financial constraints in family firms. However, thepresence of CEO duality does not exaggerate the problem of financial constraints, but rather leadsfamily firms to become stagnant in their investments. Independent directors appear to beineffective in governing family firms in issuing finances for investment. Apparently, their presencein family firms reduces firms’ investment opportunities either through internal cash and externaldebt financing, which could reduce shareholders’ value in the long-term.Keywords: Investments; Financial Constraints; Corporate Governance; Duality; IndependentDirector; Family Controlled firms.